Human behaviour is infinitely complex, the result of thousands of interactions between predispositions, external factors, and physical and cognitive processes. It is also highly unpredictable which makes meaningful social engagement difficult without the aid of some external framework such as that offered by an institution. Both formal and informal institutions can provide the element of predictability necessary for successful, complex interactions, a factor which is often overlooked by institutional analysts and designers. Drawing on a wide range of disciplines including psychology, economics, and sociological and political studies, this book develops a coherent and accessible theory for explaining the unpredictability of individual behaviour. The author then highlights the danger of institutional reforms undermining the very capacity to generate predictability which is so central to their success. This book will appeal to academics, researchers and professionals in the fields of judgement and decision-making, forecasting, management studies, behavioural economics and the new, interdisciplinary field of institutional design.
Surprise is a necessary member of a research team. My group conducts research on collective goods, like clean air, fisheries or the radio spectrum. We are interested in institutional design. The standard models for understanding our issue are economic. These models are admirably clear and advanced. But they are not interested in some phenomena that are crucial for our class of goods from a policy perspective. For example, people possess highly sensitive mechanisms for detecting cheats, and reactions to cheats are likely to be driven by individually quite irrational, but socially powerful punitive sentiments. Such findings have led us to a shift in the agenda. We now focus on fleshing out the implications of behavioural research for institutional design in the area of collective goods. Not all of us were specialists in behavioural research at the outset of our work. The group therefore went through an extended exercise in collective learning, guided by those specialists who had been willing to join us for the purpose. Starting with the biases literature, we made ever more daring forays into behavioural territory. On doing this, one cannot but be overwhelmed by the richness of findings. This experience turned out to be the surprise cause for this book: if the human mind, at least at the symbolic level, is such a mixed bag of forces and effects, how on earth can we ever interact in a meaningful way? My intuition was: it is due to institutions. This book explores the hypothesis.
Not surprisingly, I am not the first to have this intuition. But none of those who previously looked at the issues examined here combined the three bodies of literature that I rely on: psychology for problem definition; game theory for generating a benchmark; institutional phenomenology for finding solutions. None of these authors had written for the institutional designer either; they all focused on the institutional analyst. As a result, they neglected one latent policy issue: institutional reform, undertaken with the best intentions, can hamper the hidden function of existing institutional arrangements for the generation of predictability. 
